Publication Date: 1/1/75
    Pages: 5
    Date Entered: 2/23/84
    Title: PLANT SECURITY FORCE DUTIES
    January 1975
    U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
    REGULATORY GUIDE
    DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
    REGULATORY GUIDE 5.43
    PLANT SECURITY FORCE DUTIES
A. INTRODUCTION
    Paragraph (a)(3) of Section 73.50 of 10 CFR Part 73 "Physical
    Protection of Plants and Materials," requires certain licensees to
    maintain and follow written security procedures that document the
    structure of the licensee's security organization and that detail those
    duties of guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for
    security required by 10 CFR Part 73. This guide provides criteria
    acceptable to the Regulatory staff relative to the organization of the
    plant security force and duties of guards, watchmen, and other
    individuals responsible for security.
B. DISCUSSION
    In development of the plant security plan, the objective is to
    establish a security program compatible with health and safety
    considerations and compatible with efficient operation of the plant. An
    organized security force with a clearly designated chain of command is
    an effective means of implementing that program. Assignment of detailed
    responsibilities and duties addressing a variety of routine and
    emergency situations to each member of the security force will enable
    the security force to function effectively and provide the level of
    protection sought.
1. Plant Security Organization
    In order to achieve an effective security organization, it is
    important to have clearly designated management responsibilities that
    follow a logical chain of command. Accordingly, charging an individual
    in upper management with overall responsibility for security policy at
    the plant will facilitate establishment of an effective security
    organization.
    Reporting directly to the upper management individual who has
    overall security responsibility may be individuals responsible for
    implementation of specific portions of the plant security program.
    However, it is the facility guards and watchmen, along with individuals
    responsible for maintenance of security devices, who are the means by
    which the plant security plan is executed; therefore, detailed
    assignment of specific duties and responsibilities will assist the
    guards and watchmen in contributing to plant security.
2. Security Force Duties: Guards and Watchmen
    The duties of facility guards and watchmen can be categorized
    generally as follows:
    a. Security tours and inspections,
    b. Access control and searches of personnel, packages, and
    vehicles,
    c. Escort duties,
    d. Alarm system testing,
    e. Alarm station duties and recordkeeping, and
    f. Response to security incidents.
    Frequent security tours by guards and watchmen serve as a
    deterrent by providing high visibility of the plant security force.
    Moreover, such tours offer a means of continued inspection of security
    areas, physical barriers, and intrusion detection devices.
    Control of access is necessary to ensure that only duly authorized
    individuals and vehicles are permitted within protected areas, vital
    areas, and material access areas.
    Certain licenses are required by 10 CFR Part 73 to routinely
    search individuals, packages, and vehicles for explosives, firearms, and
    incendiary devices and for concealed special nuclear material. Such
    searches are most effective when performed by individuals specifically
    assigned and trained for the task of searching. Guards and watchmen
    usually perform the searches required at entrance points into a
    protected area and at exit points from material access areas.
    Visitors, vendors, and other nonemployees are required to be
    escorted while within protected areas. Escort responsibility usually is
    taken by the employee being visited. However, vehicle drivers, certain
    packages, and, in some cases, individuals being taken into a plant may
    be escorted by members of the security force.
    Alarm systems and detection devices have to be tested frequently
    to verify that they are functioning properly. A member of the plant
    security organization is usually assigned supervision of such systems
    and devices. Nonetheless, it is the individual guards and watchmen who
    monitor, use, and respond to the detection equipment and alarm systems.
    Therefore, it will assist security if they are familiar with the alarm
    systems and they verify that detection equipment is functioning
    properly. Systems can be checked during the course of routine tours by
    guards or watchmen.
    The keeping of access logs, visitor registration, records of
    security tours and inspections, and records of alarms and alarm testing
    is an essential element in an effective security program. Logs and
    records provide a necessary input to management review of plant security
    and can as well provide valuable information in the event of a security
    or safety incident. Logs and records are usually maintained by
    individuals manning alarm stations and security area access points.
    The licensee's security organization should be capable of
    maintaining plant security during a variety of security incidents such
    as bomb threats, intrusion, attempted diversion or theft of SNM,
    attempted unauthorized transport of weapons or explosives into a
    security area, etc. Detailed statements of responsibilities and
    procedures dictated by the type of incident will assist the plant
    security force in effectively coping with security incidents without
    undue risks to themselves or others.
    Of special concern are the specific actions and procedures related
    to the use of firearms by members of the plant security force. Special
    nuclear material and related facilities should not be looked upon as
    ordinary property since the theft of special nuclear material or
    sabotage of a nuclear facility would be inimical to the public health
    and safety and the common defense and security. Accordingly, members of
    the guard force should be prepared to use their firearms rather than
    permit the theft of special nuclear material or the sabotage of a
    nuclear facility. As far as the Atomic Energy Commission is aware, both
    acts would be felonies under Federal law. Theft and diversion are
    felonies under Sections 57 and 220 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
    amended, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2077 and 2272. Depending on the
    circumstances, sabotage is a felony under 18 U.S.C. Sections 2155 or
    2156. Attempts and conspiracies to commit such acts are also felonies.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
    A plant security program that is structured as suggested below,
    and that charges guards and watchmen with the duties cited below would
    be acceptable to the Regulatory staff.
1. Plant Security Organization
    The plant security organization should be under the direction of
    an individual in upper management who has the overall responsibility for
    the security of the plant. This includes development and maintenance of
    the plant security plan, approval of detailed security procedures, the
    overall training and supervision of the guard force, and the
    installation, maintenance, and testing of alarm systems, detection
    equipment, and communication equipment.
    The plant security organization should include a security manager
    who is directly responsible for the preparation of detailed security
    procedures, for training and maintaining the security force, for
    security shift assignments, and for the maintenance of alarm systems,
    detection equipment, and communication systems. The security shift
    supervisors should report to the security manager, who in turn reports
    to the upper management individual who has the overall responsibility
    for plant security.
    In addition, the plant security organization should have a member
    responsible for inspections of security personnel and equipment, for
    security personnel qualification, and for planning and assessing of
    periodic security audits, including scheduled and unscheduled drills.
    This individual should be independent of the security manager and should
    report directly to the upper management individual who has overall
    security responsibility.
    During emergency situations that may require plant employees not
    normally employed in a security function to act as guards or watchmen,
    the security manager or security shift supervisor should have authority
    to assign such employees duties as appropriate. Any employees so
    designated should be properly trained and equipped as guards or as
    watchmen (see Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and
    Qualifying of Guards and Watchmen").
2. Security Force Duties: Guards and Watchmen
    a. Security Tours and Inspections Conducted by Guards and
    Watchmen.
    Security tours should be planned so that no one area of the
    facility is toured less frequently than once every four hours. Tours
    should be conducted in a random fashion and initiated at random times.
    To ensure rapid response to an alarm, at least one guard
    should be on tour at any time. Under most conditions, however,
    additional guards or watchmen should be on tour.
    The tours should be utilized to inspect various elements of
    security hardware. A guard or watchman on a security tour should
    inspect fences, gates, locks, doors, and building walls for integrity
    and evidence of intrusion. In addition, perimeter lighting and interior
    lighting should be checked for inoperative fixtures, and clear areas
    should be inspected for items which could cover or shield an individual.
    Security faults observed on tours should be recorded and submitted to
    the on-duty security shift supervisor at the completion of each tour.
    b. Access Control and Searching of Personnel, Packages, and
    Vehicles.
    Security personnel should execute the searches and should
    exercise access control as required by Sections 73.50(c), 73.60(a)(6),
    and 73.60(b) of 10 CFR Part 73. Regulatory Guide 5.7, "Control of
    Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access
    Areas," describes access control procedures acceptable to the Regulatory
    staff. The search of personnel can be conducted either by the use of
    detection equipment or by a hands-on search.
    If the search is accomplished by use of detection equipment,
    it should be conducted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.7. The
    search for weapons and explosives should be by use of a metal weapon
    detector and an explosive detector and should be conducted at entrance
    points into protected areas. The search for concealed SNM should be
    conducted at material access area exit points by means of an SNM
    detector and a metal detector which is capable of detecting metallic
    shielding material (e.g., lead).(*) If detection equipment is not routinely used for personnel
    searches, or is not functioning, a guard or watchman stationed at the
    search point should conduct a hands-on search in lieu of using detection
    equipment.
    The severity of the hands-on search should be in accordance
    with the potential threat. A routine hands-on search for firearms and
    explosives should be conducted in the manner of a frisk or pat-down, as
    inoffensively as possible. A more thorough search is called for when
    there is reason to believe that the individual is concealing weapons,
    explosives, or special nuclear material. In such cases, a standard
    police search for concealed weapons should be performed.
    If the search is a hands-on search or is conducted by use of
    hand-held detectors, the individual performing the search should not be
    armed while the search is conducted. A second guard or armed watchman
    should be present during the search.
    Individuals such as local law enforcement officials and AEC
    couriers who are responding to a call for assistance or who are on site
    at the invitation of the licensee and who are required to be armed as
    part of their duties need not be searched or required to check their
    weapons upon entry into a protected area.
    Upon arrival of shipments into the protected area, a guard or
    watchman should check each package being delivered into the protected
    area for proper identification and authenticity or should summon an
    authorized individual to perform the check prior to removal of any
    package from the loading dock or other point of delivery. In no case
    should a package be taken directly into a material access area or vital
    area without such identification and verification.
    Prior to release of a package (including waste packages)
    form the material access area, a guard or watchman should check that
    package for concealed SNM unless exit is into a contiguous material
    access area. In most cases, verification by the guard or watchman of
    the authenticity of the signature of an individual who is authorized to
    release packages from the material access area on an intact
    tamper-indicating seal(*) of a sealed package or container constitutes
    sufficient search for SNM concealed within the package or container.
    ----------
    (*) See Regulatory Guide 5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway
    Monitors."
    ----------
    Prior to each shipment from the facility or receipt of a
    shipment at the facility, a security individual should verify the
    absence of unidentified or unauthorized packages in the
    loading/unloading area, if such area is located within the protected
    area.
    Road vehicles should be maintained under visual surveillance
    at all times when within a material access area. All vehicles,
    including licensee forklift trucks and other such nonroad vehicles,
    exiting from any material access area into a protected area should be
    searched by a guard or watchman for concealed SNM. A thorough visual
    search, including the cab and engine area, aided by a device capable of
    detecting SNM, should be performed on each vehicle being searched for
    concealed SNM.
    c. Escort Duties
    Only individuals specifically designated as "escorts" by
    plant management should be allowed to act as escorts. Such designation
    need not be limited to members of the licensee security organization. A
    call-in procedure should be employed to notify the security shift
    supervisor of movement of individuals or vehicles under escort when such
    movement is between buildings and when the escort responsibility is
    changed from one escort to another.
    d. Alarm Testing
    (1) Perimeter Intrusion Alarms. Perimeter intrusion alarm
    systems should be inspected for performance by a security individual
    according to the frequency and methods indicated in Regulatory Guide
    5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems." The testing need not be done
    in conjunction with a security patrol, but if so accomplished, only one
    or two segments of the system should be tested by any one guard or
    watchman on tour per security tour to avoid the possibility of a real
    alarm being masked by a test alarm. Any section of the alarm system
    being taken out of access mode(+) or being placed in service following
    repair should be tested for proper operation by a security individual.
    (2) Interior Intrusion Alarms. A security individual
    should be present to test or observe the test of an interior intrusion
    alarm at the time the alarm is placed in or taken out of the access mode
    or is placed in service following installation or repair. The security
    individual may be a watchman whose (nonsecurity) work station is within
    the area protected. Observation of the test may be accomplished by
    closed-circuit television (CCTV) in lieu of an attending guard or
    watchman.
    ----------
    (*) See Regulatory Guide 5.10, "Selection and Use of
    Pressure-Sensitive Seals on Containers for Onsite Storage of Special
    Nuclear Material," and Regulatory Guide 5.15, "Security Seals for the
    Protection and Control of Special Nuclear Material."
    (+) Access mode means the condition that maintains the system
    sensitive to intrusion but inhibits the audible (and in some cases
    visible) annunciation of an alarm.
    ----------
    e. Alarm Station Duties
    The onsite central alarm station should be manned by the
    security shift supervisor. That individual should know the status of
    all alarm equipment. The primary function of the security shift
    supervisor should be to dispatch other security personnel to areas from
    which alarms have been received and to call for assistance from local
    law enforcement authorities (LLEA) if needed. In addition to the
    security shift supervisor, other security personnel may be stationed in
    the central alarm station. The individual(s) in the central alarm
    station should maintain communication with security personnel on tour to
    be advised immediately of any real or suspected breach of security.
    The individual(s) in the central alarm station also should
    observe (via CCTV) and control unattended access points. The security
    shift supervisor should have the authority to dispatch guards and
    watchmen to monitor areas where alarm systems temporarily are
    inoperative and to call for repair of such systems.
    An individual attending an alarm station other than the
    central alarm station need not be a member of the plant security force.
    However, if an alarm sounds, he immediately should contact the
    individual in the central alarm station to be apprised of the situation.
    If unable to do so, he should contact the LLEA and advise them of the
    situation. Thus, he should have the responsibility to call for
    assistance if he cannot contact the onsite central alarm station.
    The security shift supervisor in the central alarm station
    should oversee the recordkeeping activities of the security force during
    his shift. He should personally log any alarm, unless this is done
    automatically, and should record the details of security force response
    to an alarm. The security manager should have overall responsibility
    for security force records. The individual observing unattended access
    points should record the access data unless this is done automatically
    via key-card reader or other automated access device. The security
    shift supervisor also should oversee the testing of communication
    equipment.
    The central alarm station should serve as a command post
    during plant emergencies unless the station itself is threatened.
    Response by facility personnel and outside assistance should be
    coordinated through the central alarm station.
    f. Response to Security Incidents
    The size of the onsite security force, the deployment of the
    security force, and the security force procedures governing response
    should be such that the security organization is capable of:
    (1) Preventing any successful theft or act of sabotage by
    one or two armed individuals or a group of unarmed people.
    (2) Delaying the attack of an armed group up to squad size
    sufficiently long to allow notification of and response by law
    enforcement authorities so that the attempted theft or sabotage is
    thwarted or stolen material is promptly recovered.
    (3) Defending itself in the event of a well-planned
    attack, executed in a disciplined and organized manner sufficiently well
    to communicate with law enforcement authorities to advise them of the
    attack and its scope and furnish information to be used as a basis for
    countermeasures and a properly escalated response by local, State or
    Federal counterforces either to prevent removal of the material or
    recover it or to initiate appropriate postsabotage action.
    In general, upon receipt of an alarm or other indication of
    a possible security threat two armed members of the licensee's security
    force should be dispatched to the area of the alarm. The individuals
    responding should assess the threat and apprise the security shift
    supervisor of the extent of the threat, if any. If a threat exists, the
    individuals responding should take no further action until assistance
    arrives from other members of the licensee security organization or from
    law enforcement authorities, if needed. There may, of course, be
    circumstances in which the responding individuals may need to take such
    action as self-defense or defense of another, prior to arrival of
    assistance. Observation of the protected area isolation zone and other
    security areas via CCTV in certain situations can alleviate the
    necessity for dispatching guards to the area of alarm and thus avoid
    exposing the responding guards to attack.
    Upon being advised of the existence and extent of a threat,
    the security shift supervisor should immediately notify law enforcement
    authorities and request appropriate action. The licensee security
    organization should take action including the use of force (to the
    extent possible under the laws of the State in which the facility is
    located) appropriate to the threat as indicated above while awaiting
    arrival of law enforcement personnel. Above all, owing to the severe
    potential for harm to the public health and safety and threat to the
    common defense and security of the United States, the unauthorized
    removal of special nuclear material from the facility or sabotage to the
    facility should be prevented. Any standing orders or policies of the
    licensee which prohibit the use of deadly force regardless of
    circumstances or which limit the use of the authority provided by law to
    employ firearms would be viewed as contrary to the intention and purpose
    of the regulation requiring armed guards.
D. IMPLEMENTATION
    The purpose of this section is to provide information to
    applicants and licensees regarding the Regulatory staff's plans for
    utilizing this regulatory guide.
    This guide reflects current regulatory practice. Therefore, except
    in those cases in which the applicant proposes an alternative method for
    complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the
    method described herein will be used immediately in the evaluation of
    submittals in connection with special nuclear material license,
    operating license, or construction permit applications.
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